Status of Citizens on Constitution Day, 2022

This essay is the third in a trio of blog-postings (8/1/22, 9/1/22, and 9/17/22) analyzing the waxing and waning of historical republics, as has been discussed in Victor Davis Hanson’s outstanding book, The Dying Citizen (Basic Books, 2021).  A republic presupposes citizens, as opposed to individuals existing in a state of nature or as the subjects of an autocracy or oligarchy.  This year’s Constitution Day (September 17, 2022) marks 235 years since the signing, in Philadelphia, of the U.S. Constitution prior to its adoption by the states and its establishment of the U.S. as a republic of citizens.

Before the institution of a republic, Hanson considers individuals to be “pre-citizens.”  In the immediately preceding (9/1/22) blog post, we looked at one type of pre-citizen, the peasant.  In today’s blog post, we examine two additional concepts of pre-citizen: the resident and the tribe member.  We will conclude with an estimate of the status of U.S. citizens on Constitution Day, 2022.

Citizens are members of a civil society who are united for the purpose of forming a republic and making laws.  Following Kant, we observe that the citizen has three characteristics: the lawful freedom to obey no other law than that to which he has given his consent; equality with all others before the law; and economic autonomy, or the responsibility for one’s own support as a member of the commonwealth (republic).  Whether in a constitutional convention or as an accumulation of precedent, the people constitute themselves as a state with coercive power in an original contract.  The people thereby give up their external freedom and take it back immediately as members of a republic.

Residents are merely those who live in a particular place, whereas citizens are individuals who have legal rights and duties even if they temporarily live outside the republic granting them citizenship.  Historically, as Hanson writes in his Chapter Two, immigrants arriving in the U.S. were expected to surrender their previous identities (e.g., to forego acting as foreign agents, etc.) and to adopt an American identity out of gratitude for the rights conveyed by the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution (i.e., to adopt American values as delineated in the republic’s founding documents).  The existence of this gratitude or adopted set of values - - in a word, this assimilation - - was freely presupposed, for why else would new immigrants have undertaken the arduous journeys required in previous centuries?

New immigrants to the U.S., it was originally thought, had no more reason than anyone else to create factions within the U.S.; in any event, the U.S. was governed by checks and balances countering potential factions.  Eventually, the legal differences between citizens and various types of aliens (from the Latin alienus, meaning foreigner, stranger, or belonging to another country or people) were established in U.S. law; and the U.S. became the world’s oldest functioning constitutional republic of citizens.

Today, Hanson observes, social cohesion (assimilation of immigrants) in the U.S. is challenged by the huge numbers of impoverished, illegal aliens arriving in the U.S. without high school diplomas, fluency in English, or the incentive to assimilate.  It would seem that there is a progressive elite in the U.S. that encourages non-assimilation in order to cultivate a dependent class of clients and future voters.  Hanson offers a flagrant example of such encouragement of non-assimilation on his page 71: In a recent U.S. Presidential primary election, a certain non-Spanish-speaking, third-generation American candidate, who holds a Stanford degree, appealed for pollical support from non-assimilated individuals from Mexico and Latin America.  These non-assimilated individuals were presumably thrilled by that candidate’s consistent use of trilled r’s and of Spanish pronunciations for the buzz-words of identity politics.  Hanson finds (page 75) that huge numbers of immigrants arise from an open-border policy that is consistent with corporate America’s desire for cheap labor and with many politicians’ desires for client-voters.

On his pages 96-97, Hanson finds that open borders are being accepted in popular media and elite institutions as a universal right to emigrate anywhere in the world.  Thus, “we are reverting to the world of the pre-citizen and to a pre-nation mindset,” which is reminiscent of “the latter fifth century AD, when Vandals, Visigoths, Ostrogoths, and Huns freely crossed into Roman lands.”  The U.S. Constitution does not guarantee anyone such a right, and this immense immigration “suggests that citizenship, as defined by the Constitution, in some ways no longer really exists.”

Tribalism, the subject of Hanson’s Chapter Three, is the theory that the divisions of a traditional society are based primarily on kin groups (sets of individuals with blood ties) and their chieftains.  The word tribe derives from the Latin for “three-fold,” referring to the tradition that there were originally three tribes in the Roman state before the advent of one unified citizenry in the Roman Republic.  As Hanson remarks on his page 100, “Rome gave us the word natio (nation) to reflect the revolutionary idea that the free citizens of a state did not all have to look the same way … [in order] to enjoy the same rights.”  In other words, the Roman Republic rejected tribalism.

Likewise, American multiracialism envisions one unified citizenry within the U.S., with one common culture existing in any number of races.  The U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1788, provided for the abolition of the foreign slave trade after 20 years, as well for the infamous “3/5 compromise,” which were necessary both for the unanimous adoption of the Constitution and for the establishment of the former colonies’ common defense.  (Like clockwork, in 1808 Jefferson signed enabling legislation outlawing the foreign slave trade.)  In other words, the U.S. Constitution aims at the ideal of a non-racial citizenship.

Today, however, a new competitor, multiculturalism, is at war with traditional American multiracialism.  Multiculturalism seeks to define the country by many cultures, some of which are mutually antagonistic; and envisions a continual feuding of various races, sects, tribes, and identities for hegemony in an existential fight to control culture and government.

Tribalism, now seen as essentially synonymous with multiculturalism, was until recently regarded as backward, reactionary, and pre-civilizational, marking a road to chaos (Hanson, p. 101).  Examples of disastrous tribalism appear in the Jim-Crow South, the castes of India, the racial laws of fascist states, the apartheid of South Africa, and the warring regions of the former Yugoslavia.

Earlier, Thucydides had argued that tribal people were inherently nomadic and incapable of civilization.  In contrast, the Greek polis replaced blood ties with the offer of rights and duties for citizens.  Various republics waxed and waned over time, yet tribalism never went wholly extinct.  Tribalism has now reappeared as the preferred progressive tool for identification of individuals by race and gender.  Hanson notes (p. 108) that in the 1950’s American campus housing was segregated by race, that in the 1960’s such segregation was banned, but that by the 2020’s segregated living quarters and “safe spaces” have become trendy again.  Multiculturalism is eclipsing multiracialism.

Why, Hanson asks (p. 115), has the theory of race and gender victimization overtaken the Marxist doctrine of class oppression as the main revolutionary creed?  One might speculate that the class of the poor, typically defined as the lowest-income 20% of the U.S. population, is smaller than the class of non-whites, which is around 40% of the U.S. population.  Moreover, upward and downward mobility ensures that the lowest-income 20% are not the same individuals year after year, whereas ethnicity is presumably a fixed characteristic.  Hence, some politicians would expect to find at least twice as many clients if race and gender are the defining categories of victimization instead of income level.

“Marginalized groups” are defined as sets of individuals supposedly victimized today due to the behavior of some others’ ancestors in the remote past.  Multiculturalism, or tribalism, results in individuals within “marginalized groups” now being treated unequally (preferentially) at the expense of individuals within officially non-marginalized groups in a perverse, Orwellian rendition of equality and fairness.  For example, Hanson points out (pp. 131-132) that the “chief diversity and inclusion officer” in a major city fired a prominent, white city employee in 2017 on the basis of race, because it was deemed necessary to “uplift our identities and our separate ethnicities in order to instill a sense of pride and community and support for one another.”  Thus, we see that tribalism is a way to give social preferences to individuals based on superficial appearance rather than on merit or the legal treatment of citizens.

Conclusion: Throughout history, republics have waxed and waned (see the 8/1/22 blog posting).  The U.S. Republic and its citizens are now under duress, based on three metrics that Hanson has presented: First, a bimodal distribution of peasants and masters has largely replaced an economically autonomous middle class via unfair trade and ruinous debt (see the 9/1/22 blog posting).  Second, open borders, combined with patron-politicians and client-voters, have replaced the ideal of assimilated citizens with the fact of “mere residents.”  Third, a retribalization of society has occurred, in which superficial appearance has largely replaced merit and the legal rights of citizens.  Based upon this evidence, it would seem (to the current reviewer) that the prognosis for U.S. citizens and their republic on this Constitution Day is for a future that is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” as its ruling class attempts to retain power.  There is always the possibility, however, that U.S. citizens might discover a previously unknown, modern-day Horatius at their bridge into the future, a Horatius who might ward off attackers and prolong the tenuous existence of the U.S. Republic.

The Peasant as a Type of Pre-Citizen

One month ago on this website, we began a discussion of the historical waxing and waning of republics, which is the subject of Victor Davis Hanson’s excellent book, The Dying Citizen (Basic Books, 2021).  Hanson references Kantian political theory before proceeding to focus on U.S. citizens.  

Section 46 of Kant’s Metaphysical Elements of Justice [Metaphysische Anfangsgruende der Rechtslehre], which is a subset of his Metaphysics of Morals [Die Metaphysik der Sitten], defines citizens as the members of civil society who are united for the purpose of forming a republic and making laws.  The citizen has three characteristics: the lawful freedom to obey no other law than that to which he has given his consent; equality with all others before the law; and civil independence, or the responsibility for the provision of his own support as a member of the commonwealth.  Proceeding from the presupposition that a citizen must be sufficiently muscular in order to wield the tools of war and commerce, thereby becoming “materially invested” in the success of the state; Kant finds that people such as apprentices, servants, minors, and women, etc., may be designated as “fellow comrades of the state,” but not as voters or citizens - - at least not in the year 1797.

It is to be emphasized that there are three basic characteristics of a Kantian citizen: freedom to choose one’s republic and vote for its laws, equality before the law, and economic autonomy.

In Section 47 of his Metaphysical Elements, Kant introduces the notion that the act by means of which the people constitute themselves as a state (a civil society with coercive power) is the original contract.  (One assumes that “the people constituting themselves” may be a one-time constitutional convention, an accumulation of historical precedents, or some combination thereof.)  The people give up their external freedom and take it back immediately as members of a commonwealth (republic).  An individual, as a “pre-citizen,” abandons his wild, lawless freedom (the Hobbesian “perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death”) in order to find his freedom as a law-abiding citizen.  

One notes here a certain, ever-present danger of equivocation on the term “pre-citizen.”  First, that term may refer to hypothetical or quasi-mythical individuals lost in the mists of time, some of whom are said to have participated in a legendary constitutional convention or to have memorialized certain political precedents.  Alternately, that term may refer to a definite population from which were drawn certain known individuals who participated in an actual constitutional convention.  Finally, that term may refer to contemporary, erstwhile citizens who have lost their previously inalienable rights due to a revolution against a previously established republic.

According to Hanson, there are three types of pre-citizens: peasants, “mere residents,” and tribes.  Today, the concept of peasant focuses primarily not on an originally agrarian type of work, but rather on an abject subservience and lack of upward mobility.  In the third blog posting in this series (8/1/22, 9/1/22, and 9/17/22), the concepts of “mere residents” (individuals purporting to have the rights of citizenship without the corresponding duties) and of tribes (individuals purporting to have social preferences based on superficial appearance rather than on legal merit) will be discussed.

In the Kantian analysis of citizenship, it would seem to follow that if the constitution of a republic is corrupted by physical violence or by an Orwellian redefinition of terms; then erstwhile citizens will be divided de facto into one or another of two new classes: either a newly subjugated, non-free, unequal, and dependent class of “pre-citizens,” analogous to the “head count” of ancient Rome and sorely in need of a new constitutional convention; or a newly privileged ruling class of “post-citizens,” by which is meant a class of overlords who rule as unelected bureaucrats, evolving-document theorists, and economic globalists.

The thesis has often been advanced that a republic and its citizens depend on the existence of a middle class that can moderate some occasional political storms.  (Hanson notes on his pages 22-23 that this idea dates back to the ancient Greeks, who doubted the reliability of the poor, who could not afford weapons; as well as the zeal of the rich, who were too indolent to defend their polis.)  Failing such a middle-class defense, a republic can easily bifurcate into a new class of contemporary pre-citizens who lose the enforceability of their rights, however recently deemed to have been inalienable; and into a new class of post-citizens who gain overlordship via purported expertise in public administration, in flexible legal interpretation, and in beneficent economic redistribution.  

Kant’s third criterion for citizenship, namely, that citizens be civilly independent (economically autonomous) is violated in case the middle class does not have the material resources to resist encroachments against its freedoms.  If a middle class sees declining economic circumstances and ruinous debt (think: unfair trade and trillions of dollars of student-loan debt); then the corresponding republic wanes, its citizens move away and/or die off, and a bimodal distribution of peasants and masters arises.  In this case, Hanson writes on his page 15, “the function of government is not to ensure liberty but to subsidize the poor [in order] to avoid revolution and to exempt the wealthy” from adverse outcomes of government policy.  The wealthy then “reciprocate by enriching and empowering the governing classes.”

On his pages 40-42, Hanson points out that the contemporary U.S. middle class foresees very limited possibilities for long-term employment and family formation; and a much greater likelihood of becoming peasants resembling their rural predecessors in having few options.  However, some problematic options do exist: Hanson writes of two recent, government-sponsored advertisements for ameliorating individual helplessness via public largess.  First, the Pajama Boy (2010), an Obamacare supporter, portrays a young man who appears self-assured and at ease while pitching Obamacare despite wearing a child’s red-plaid pajamas.  This advertisement, Hanson finds, is an inadvertent confirmation of de Tocqueville’s warning about the connection between government subsidies and eternal childishness.  Second, the Life of Julia (2012) is the story of a woman reflecting back on her satisfying lifetime of harvesting public payments and accommodations, all the while oblivious to the looming financial problems of the Social Security system.  Neither the Pajama Boy nor Julia offer a real solution to the contemporary violation of Kant’s third criterion for citizenship.

In sharp distinction to Julia’s lifetime reflections on her dependency, Hanson (on his page 60) can reflect back on his “free-range” childhood in Fresno County, California, and see something completely different: He and his siblings could wander unsupervised over miles of rural countryside as the children of free citizens in a stable Republic.  By today, however, that Republic - - a least in its previous incarnation - - has already fallen; because its citizens, having run afoul of Kant’s third criterion for citizenship, have for the most part gone bankrupt, moved away, and are dying out.  Indeed, allowing children so to roam the countryside today would be considered as a form of child abuse because of ubiquitous gangs, untethered fighting dogs, and illegal, toxic trash dumps.  The Republic that we see today does indeed seem largely to have achieved the bimodal distribution of peasants and masters that Hanson has described.

Waxing and Waning Republics and Their Citizens

The democracy of ancient Athens managed, in effect, to vote itself out of existence via military misjudgments during the Peloponnesian War.  The Roman Republic had a mostly unwritten tradition (constitution) of limitations upon its democratic assemblies; but the Gracchi brothers, while serving as tribunes, undermined those limitations by imposing various costly policies: Land redistribution in the country, cheap grain in the cities, shovel-ready infrastructure jobs for the unemployed, and overseas colonies for the landless.  Opposition to these policies initiated a new tradition of political violence culminating in the collapse of the Roman Republic and the institution of the Roman Empire.

In the subsequent Western tradition, there is a history of kings, oligarchs, tyrants, or democratic assemblies presiding over populations of subjects, clients, persons of indefinite servitude, or citizens, etc.  (This listing is not meant to be exhaustive.)  To the extent that democracies and republics have track records of fairly miraculous creation and ultimate collapse, one expects any given population occasionally to transition between a more-democratic status and a less-democratic status.  Indeed, an analytic industry for ranking democracies has sprung up online.  In other words, democracies and republics wax and wane.

Kings, oligarchs, and tyrants typically seize power and assign populations to subordinate status.  Successful democratic uprisings or constitutional conventions are relatively rare and assign populations to the status of citizen.  It would seem that a relatively leisured class - - of independent means, if not of wealth - - must first exist and take the lead in forming a republic before an entire population can assume its role as citizens.  Theorists typically assume that a republic is maintained in existence by all its citizens.

If, as Benjamin Franklin said, the U.S. Constitutional Convention “gave you a Republic, if you can keep it”; and if a class of independent U.S. citizens is necessary for the maintenance of the U.S. as a republic; then any factors that degrade and depopulate the class of independent U.S. citizens also undermines the Republic established among them. This is the current writer’s formulation of the concern expressed by the author Victor Davis Hanson in his excellent book, The Dying Citizen (Basic Books, 2021).  In the Introduction to his book, Hanson mentions the theory of democracy as expounded by Kant in Teil I of his Die Metaphysik der Sitten.  (This Part I is also known in English as The Metaphysical Elements of Justice.)  This blog posting summarizes Kant’s work in this regard.

We note at once that the U.S. Constitutional Convention occurred in 1787, whereas Kant’s analyses of “perpetual peace” and “metaphysical elements of justice” appeared in 1795 and 1797, respectively.  These political developments seem to have developed in parallel from a common Zeitgeist.

In Section 44 of his Metaphysical Elements, Kant states that the necessity of public lawful coercion is not empirical but rests on an a priori idea of reason, namely, that even if we imagine mankind before the institution of government to be entirely congenial and good-natured; individual men, nations, and states can never be certain of being free from future violence, because each man in a state of nature has a right to do what seems to him to be just.  (Note that a nation is a group of people with some commonality of language, history, socio-economic traditions, culture, religion, place of origin, etc.; whereas a state is a group of people under a common, lawful government with coercive power.)  If one wants a system of justice, then one must quit the state of nature and join in a civil society (societas civilis), i.e., a state that recognizes some things (external goods and intrinsic dignity) as one’s own.  Acquisition of things and of rights are only provisional as long as there is no sanction of public law.

In Section 45 of his Metaphysical Elements, Kant further describes the state (civitas, sometimes rendered in English as civil state) as the union of a multitude of people under laws of justice.  Every state contains three authorities: The sovereign authority resides in the person of the legislator; the executive authority resides in the person of the ruler (who conforms to the law); and the judicial authority resides in the person of the judge (who decides who is due what in particular cases).

In Section 46 of his Metaphysical Elements, Kant discusses the legislative authority and the citizen.  The members of civil society who are united for the purpose of making laws are called citizens (cives).  The citizen has three juridical attributes: First, he has the lawful freedom to obey no other law than that to which he has given his consent.  Second, he is equal to all others before the law.  Third, he is civilly independent, owing his existence and support, not to someone else’s arbitrary will but rather to his own rights and industry as a member of the commonwealth.

Kant thinks that “fitness for voting is a prerequisite of being a citizen.”  Apprentices, servants, minors, and women - - on Kant’s view in 1797 - - are examples of dependent persons who are not themselves citizens and who do not have a right to vote, because they are not materially invested in the success of the state.  People without the right to vote may be designated as “fellow comrades of the state,” but not as citizens.  The presupposition seems to be that a citizen must be sufficiently muscular in order to wield the tools or war and commerce.  Hence, even the most enlightened, Kantian thought endorsed the concept of “material investment” as a prerequisite for voting and citizenship.

In Section 47 of his Metaphysical Elements, Kant introduces the notion that the act by means of which the people constitute themselves as a state is the original contract.  The people give up their external freedom and take it back immediately as members of a commonwealth.  An individual abandons his wild, lawless freedom in order to find freedom within lawful dependency.

In the next blog posting we will summarize V. D. Hanson’s discussion of the contemporary waning of a U.S. citizenry overwhelmed by population groups once thought to be inimical to a republic: peasants, residents (as in “mere residents”), and tribes.

Pentecost, Holy Spirit, and Zeitgeist

Shavuot (“Weeks”) is the second of three Jewish Pilgrim Festivals, occurring fifty days after the first day of Passover and marking the end of the wheat harvest in Israel.  In the earliest Christian documents, there are also two holidays counted as being fifty days apart: If Easter counts as Day1, then Pentecost (“fiftieth,” in Greek) counts as Day 50.  Today, we would be more inclined to say that the latter is 49 days after the former.  Pentecost marks the arrival of the Holy Spirit, the presence of God, among believers who subsequently came to be called Christians in Acts 11:26.  It is desired in this essay to distinguish the Holy Spirit from what is known in philosophy as the Zeitgeist, or spirit of the age.

At Pentecost, the apostle Peter addressed the crowd as recorded in a Biblical passage [Acts 2:14 – 41 (typically estimated as occurring circa 30 A.D.)].  Peter used a quotation from the prophet Joel that links the pouring out of the Spirit of God with the coming of the great and glorious day of the Lord, when all who call upon the name of the Lord will be saved.  Speaking to that day’s relatively large pilgrim crowd, Peter said that you (crowd members), with the help of wicked men, put him (Jesus) to death, despite his being accredited to you by God via miracles, wonders, and signs.  Upon hearing Peter’s address, the people (crowd members) were cut to the heart and asked one another “Brothers, what shall we do [in view of this despicable crime]?” 

The formulation and clarification of existential questions such as “What shall we do?” can be described (e.g., by Hegel) as the work of the Zeitgeist, or “spirit of the age.”  The Zeitgeist catalogues the historical stages in the unfolding of reason into theses and antitheses, the resolving of apparent contradictions, the synthesis of higher modes of thought, and the approach towards Absolute Knowing.  Many contemporaneous finite spirits (human beings) contribute to the overall spirit of an age: For example, the spirit of Voltaire and the spirits of his contemporaries led to the Zeitgeist of the Enlightenment.  In other words, it is the work of the Zeitgeist to create a “rational buzz” among the opinion leaders of a society.  This “buzz” allows existential questions, ultimate concerns, and proposed answers to become widely known.  Over time, the import of the existential question “What shall we do?” became known to an increasingly large subpopulation of the Roman world in the Near East and beyond.  Some fraction of that subpopulation became Christian believers.

In Acts 2:38, Peter responded to the “What shall we do?” question, saying “Repent and be baptized … for the forgiveness of sins and the gift of the Holy Spirit.”  One observes that the Zeitgeist played its role by creating a “buzz” (existential question), while the Holy Spirit played its role by inspiring Peter to state the correct answer.  Hence, anyone living in the ancient society generating this “buzz” could take a position on the existential question, whether or not he or she was aware of the explicit concepts of Zeitgeist or Holy Spirit.

After Pentecost, Peter spoke to onlookers at the temple in Acts 3:11-26, again criticizing the people for handing over Jesus of Nazareth for execution and calling on them to “Repent and be converted so that sins may be washed away and that times of refreshment may ensue.”  This second response of Peter, occurring in Acts 3:19, was a reformulation of his initial response (Acts 2:38), as appropriate for that day’s communication in the temple. 

Perhaps 20 years later, during Paul’s second missionary journey (typically estimated as occurring during a three-year subset of the interval from 49 to 55 A.D.), Paul and Silas were imprisoned at Philippi, as recounted in Acts 16:16-40.  A prison-destroying earthquake ensued, placing the jailer’s life in jeopardy because of the apparent escape of the incarcerated due to the failure of the infrastructure.  The jailer asked Paul and Silas “Sirs, what must I do to be saved?”  In Acts 16:31 Paul and Silas gave a third response to the existential question first posed at Pentecost: “Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved - - you and your household.”  [The speed with which the jailer’s household converted might be taken as evidence of a Zeitgeist already at work in Philippi even before the earthquake (see Acts 16:11-15).] 

In summary, the three “existential responses” presented above are (#1) Repent and be baptized for the forgiveness of sins and the gift of the Holy Spirit, (#2) Repent and be converted (turn again) so that sins may be washed away and that times of refreshment may ensue, and (#3) Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you and your household will be saved.

Relying on the Greek-language resources embedded in the biblehub.com website, we see that each of the three existential responses begins with either (a) repent (metanoesate) or (b) believe on (pisteuson epi) the Lord Jesus.  (The second response, today, would be idiomatically rendered as believing in, or on the basis of, the Lord Jesus.)  Metanoesate means next to or beyond what is thought, implying a thinking differently.  Pisteuson epi implies mentally endorsing the truth of some proposition on some adequate basis.  After or beyond this rearrangement of thinking on the basis of perceived reality (against subjective natural inclinations), the benefits mentioned in responses #1 - #3 ensue.

In responses #1 - #3 there seems to be a presupposition that thinking and acting against natural inclinations and in favor of Christian doctrines and precepts will lead the spiritually engaged person to ingrafting into the body of Christ, to forgiveness, to the gift of the Holy Spirit, and to salvation.  Inclinations that are founded merely on the Zeitgeist and that contradict Biblical exegesis are referred to as heretical or immoral inclinations.  Over the course of millennia many varieties of heresies, immoralities, and perversions have been identified.

The Philippian jailer’s question “Sirs, what must I do to be saved?” can be recast as “Against what natural inclinations must I think and act?”  The answer must surely include opposing heretical thoughts and repudiating immoral actions, thereby avoiding any acquiescence in thoughts and actions proceeding from a defective Zeitgeist.

The distinction between the Holy Spirit, proceeding from God (or from the Father and the Son), and the Zeitgeist, proceeding from the best current efforts of rational thought among finite spirits, seems to be reasonably clear.  But yet some individuals in some churches on some occasions today are revealing a deep-seated confusion between the Holy Spirit and the Zeitgeist: Bold proclamations are heard from some individuals who are pleased to announce that they are “proud to be who they are,” i.e., agents who do not think and act against natural inclination, at least on the really big issues.  But if, say, 5% of a population engages in perversion X, while 0.5% partakes of perversion Y, etc.; then one is left wondering why the vast majority of that population should be compelled to listen to recitations of alleged “existential authenticity” by those afflicted with X or Y.  Is therapeutic utility the decisive factor justifying these public proclamations?  If so, does therapeutic utility entail toleration, normalization, or encouragement of similar behavior?

The author notes in passing that the concept of “therapeutic utility,” popularized in the 1960’s by Philip Rieff, characterizes a transition phase between the Mainline Protestantism of the mid-twentieth century and [what Ross Douthat has recently called (in First Things, June-July 2022)] the Post-Protestant Gnosticism of the twenty-first century.

Perhaps therapeutic utility ought not to be a foundational religious principle: On December 14, 2021 the Pew Research Center released a social-survey report stating that self-identified Christians made up 63% of the U.S. population in 2021, down from 78% in 2007.  One might interpret this data by saying that identity politics, therapeutic utility, etc. are increasingly seen by the U.S. population as tangential to true religion.  One thinks also of the Indulgence Crisis of 1517: At some point the people rejected such advertising jingles as “when a coin in the coffer rings, a soul up from purgatory springs” and ceased buying indulgences.  As another example of moral intuitionism, consider the rebelling cowboys confronting the arbitrary disciplinary actions ordered, under duress, by the cattle baron Thomas Dunson (John Wayne) in the 1948 movie Red River: The rebels exclaimed “You were just wrong, Tom!” before hijaaking the cattle drive from Missouri to Kansas.  In summary, the moral intuitionism of the people cannot be ignored forever, despite the allure of therapeutic utility.

The modern, therapeutic question for the Philippian jailer to have posed might have been: “Sirs, what must I do to receive an imperial pardon and a check for infrastructure repair?”  But in the event, the Philippian jailer, and the Zeitgeist of the Greco-Roman-Jewish-Christian world in the mid-first century A.D., got the existential question right by asking: “Sirs, what must I do to be saved?”  Today, it would seem that rational agents have plenty of work to do in repairing the Zeitgeist before it can ever possibly converge upon Absolute Knowing.

Coronavirus: Review of Public-Health Issues

What has the battle against Covid-19 looked like from the perspective of a public-health policy expert?  Scott W. Atlas, M.D. has written the book, “A Plague Upon Our House,” regarding his fight at the White House to stop Covid from destroying America.  This book is an imprint of Post Hill Press and has ISBN 978-1-63758-551-1 (paperback).  The following discussion is based on Chapter 20 and the Coda appearing in that book.

Atlas quotes (on his page 272) Professor Sunetra Gupta, who wrote that assumptions rapidly accumulate in mathematical models of epidemiology, often leading to very large errors in predicted numbers of deaths.  Some models’ results for coronavirus deaths were sometimes too high by a factor of 4.5, leading to a harmful clamor for economic lockdowns despite their inevitable side-effects: other medical treatments missed, education-years foregone, mental-health problems incurred, and alarmist health-policy groupthink rationalized.  

Were children especially at risk?  Atlas reports (on his page 276) that as of June 9, 2021 there were 62,538 Covid deaths in California, and exactly ZERO of them were children under 18.  The European Center for Disease Prevention surveyed seventeen countries and found that open schools were not associated with accelerating community transmission.  On his page 282, Atlas states that his home state of California, having less than 17% of its students in fully in-person schools as of June 2021, compared unfavorably with Florida, which had 100% of its students in fully in-person schools at that time.

Atlas finds that the attachment of the general public and of government leaders to face-masking is unfounded.  On his page 296, Atlas mentions a study published in May 2021 by University of Louisville researchers, who found that mask mandates and use are not associated with lower SARS-Cov-2 spread in the U.S.  Atlas finds that the public’s refusal to accept that masks are not needed after vaccination is evidence for the existence of deeply damaged psyches and of invincible groupthink among many Americans.

On his page 299, Atlas notes that decades of research on lives lost from unemployment and missed medical care indicate that the pandemic lockdowns were very harmful.  Through May 2020, 1.5 million years of life had been lost due to lockdowns, which was almost double the 800,000 years of life that had been lost due to Covid-19.  Atlas also mentions the harmful ideas of the bureaucrat Redfield (see page 287 for the idea that universal masking would defeat the pandemic in eight to twelve weeks) and of the bureaucrats Fauci and Birx (see page 307 for Fauci-Birx lockdowns as the antitheses of the Florida approach).  In the opinion of Atlas, these bureaucrats caused a great deal of unnecessary carnage among the American people.  On pages 307 – 310, Atlas affirms the superior anti-pandemic performance by the state of Florida, led by its Governor DeSantis, who opposed masking mandates and prolonged lockdowns.  Instead, Florida maintained open schools and, among the ten largest states, had the lowest age-adjusted mortality rate for all ages.

On his pages 315 - 330, Atlas relates how, immediately after being introduced by the U.S. President at his August 10, 2020 press briefing, he (Atlas) was attacked by totalitarians posing as mainstream media.  YouTube pulled down some of his video interviews.  Twitter blocked his account.  In February 2021, JAMA (Journal of the American Medical Association) published a defamatory attack on him.  The totalitarians’ first Orwellian lie to the public was that anything said against lockdowns was a choice of money over lives.  This was not true: The issue is number of life-years lost in various scenarios when accounting for all risks.  The totalitarians’ second Orwellian lie to the public was that the anti-lockdown position advocated letting the infection spread freely until herd immunity would be achieved.  This was not true: The issue is the relative merit of universal lockdowns versus the focused protection of the most vulnerable, especially of those in nursing homes.  Atlas’ viewpoint was encapsulated in the Great Barrington Declaration, which has been co-signed by 14,794 public-health officials and medical scientists, as well as 43,575 medical practitioners as of June 27, 2021.

There are other negative aspects of U.S. public-health policy as well.  In the print edition of the Wall Street Journal on January 27, 2022, Dr. Marty Makary described the ruin of many lives by public-health officials who have insisted that workers with natural immunity be fired unless they were also vaccinated.  In contradiction to that approach, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) last week released data showing that natural immunity (the immunity acquired by an unvaccinated person who recovers form Covid-19) is 2.8 times more effective in preventing hospitalization, compared with vaccination.  Moreover, natural immunity is between 3.3 and 4.7 times more effective in preventing Covid-19 infection, compared with vaccination.  

Makary notes that the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has always disdained natural immunity as having unknown longevity, even while refusing to study the matter.  Hence, Makary and some colleagues at Johns Hopkins University did the required study themselves: Among 295 unvaccinated people who recovered from Covid-19, 99% of them had Covid-19 antibodies up to nearly two years after infection.  This result should be unsurprising, because other severe coronaviruses such as SARS and MERS also confer lasting immunity.

In Makary’s opinion, public-health officials have a lot of explaining to do.  Even CDC director Walensky signed the “John Snow memorandum” of October 2020 declaring that there is no evidence for natural immunity to SARS-CoV-2 following natural infection.  In view of the clinical fact that no one ever sees reinfected patients on ventilators, something must be causing that observed absence - - and that something is natural immunity!  Nevertheless, public-health officials recklessly destroyed the careers of some pilots, truck drivers, teachers, soldiers, and others who had recovered form Covid-19 and who chose not to be vaccinated.  

Adverse effects of this irrational public-health policy (ignoring natural immunity) have also invaded hospitals.  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services decreed that all facilities under its jurisdiction must require vaccination of staff.  [The U.S. Supreme Court disallowed such a mandate in the case of OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Agency).]  One understaffed hospital in Washington state, having lost 55 staff due to non-vaccination, ran so short of workers that it “summoned staff who were Covid-positive to return to work even if they were sick,” but with only mild to moderate illness.

By way of summary of the critiques of public-health policy offered by Makary and Atlas: Makary concludes that many politicians and public-health officials owe apologies to American workers and that fired workers with natural immunity should be rehired.  Atlas goes further by comparing “the Party” in George Orwell’s dystopian novel, 1984, to today’s coterie of leading public-health officials.  Atlas (on his page 317) quotes Orwell: “If all others accepted the lie which the Party imposed - - if all records told the same tale - - then the lie passed into history and became truth.”